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This paper uses a panel of 24184 UK firms over the period 1993-2003 to study the extent to which the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow differs at firms facing different levels of internal and external 
financial constraints. Our results suggest that when the sample is split on the basis of the level of 
internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between investment and cash flow is U-shaped. 
On the other hand, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the 
degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Combining the internal with the external 
financial constraints, we find that the dependence of investment on cash flow is strongest for those 
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1. Introduction 
An intense debate has been taking place in recent years about the extent to which 
firms’ investment is constrained by the availability of finance, and more specifically, 
about whether a positive and statistically significant relationship between investment 
and cash flow can be seen as an indicator of financial constraints (see Shiantarelli, 
1995; Hubbard, 1998; and Bond and Van Reenen, 2005, for surveys). Some studies 
have questioned whether there is any significant financial constraint on investment at 
all.  
The debate has been almost entirely based on data from firms quoted on the 
US stock market. Yet, financial constraints on quoted firms are likely to be relatively 
weak, especially in a country with highly developed financial markets like the United 
States. A sharper test of the effects of financial constraints on investment would be 
obtained from a sample that included a large number of unquoted firms. Moreover it 
seems likely that financial constraints are a bigger issue in Europe, where financial 
markets are in general less developed, and where there is more reliance on bank 
finance.  
Accordingly, in the present study, we attempt to shed further light on the 
debate by using, for the first time, a large panel of financial data on UK firms, over 99 
percent of which are not quoted on the stock market. Specifically, we estimate, both 
separately and jointly, the effects of “internal” financial constraints (availability of 
internal funds) and “external” financial constraints (access to external finance) on 
firms’ investment. Using firms’ cash flow as a measure of the former, and firms’ size 
and age as proxies for the latter, we find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
responds differently according to the type of constraint. The sensitivity is particularly 
large when external constraints are strong and internal constraints are weak. This 
suggests that investment by successful young, small firms may be significantly 
constrained by access to external finance, which has long been a matter of policy 
concern. 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2, we summarize 
the main points of controversy about cash flow’s role in determining firms’ 
investment. We also present some theoretical arguments, supporting the hypothesis 
that internal and external financial constraints lead to different predictions relative to 
the sensitivity of firms’ investment to cash flow. Section 3 provides a description of 
our data set, together with some summary statistics. Section 4 illustrates our baseline   3
specification and our estimation methodology. Section 5 presents our main results and 
robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Why does cash flow matter for investment? Economic background 
2.1  Summary of the principal points of the controversy 
The debate on whether high sensitivities of investment to cash flow can be interpreted 
as indicators of financial constraints started with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen’s 
(FHP hereafter) 1988 pioneering paper, according to which firms with low dividend 
payout ratios (i.e. firms that are more likely to face financial constraints) display a 
higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow. A number of papers followed, focusing 
not only on firms’ investment behavior, but also on their inventory investment, their 
R&D investment, or their employment decisions. These studies generally supported 
FHP’s (1988) main conclusion. 
A significant challenge to FHP’s (1988) work came with Kaplan and Zingales 
(hereafter KZ, 1997). Instead of using the dividend payout ratio as an indicator of 
financial constraints, these authors used other criteria, reclassifying FHP’s low-
dividend sub-sample of firms on the basis of information contained in the firms’ 
annual reports as well as managements’ statements on liquidity. They found that 
investment at firms that appeared less financially constrained by these criteria was 
more, rather than less, sensitive to cash flow than investment at other firms. They 
therefore concluded that higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow cannot be 
interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially constrained
1. A heated debate 
followed (Cleary, 1999; FHP, 2000; KZ, 2000; Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; 
Cleary et al., 2004)
2.  
The different conclusions reached by these two groups of authors can be explained 
by the different ways in which they measured financial constraints. Broadly, most 
                                                 
1 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) also presented a simple theoretical model according to which the degree 
of firms’ financial constraints does not need to vary monotonically with their investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. 
2 An important theoretical challenge to the hypothesis that a significant coefficient on cash flow in an 
investment reduced form regression can be seen as an indication of the existence of financial 
constraints comes from Gomes (2001). Gomes (2001) shows that the existence of financial constraints 
is not sufficient to obtain significant cash flow effects, and that in some cases, cash flow can add some 
predictive power to investment equations even in the absence of financial constraints. This could 
happen in the presence of a persistent wedge between average and marginal Q, which could be a result 
of market power. Also see Boyle and Guthrie (2003); Cooper and Ejarque (2001, 2003); Dasgupta and 
Sengupta (2003); and Moyen (2004) for other theoretical challenges to the hypothesis that a high 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be seen as evidence of financial constraints.   4
studies that have found results in line with those of FHP (1988) defined financial 
constraints using criteria such as firms’ size, age, dividend payout ratio, or 
information on whether they have a bond rating and/or access to commercial paper. 
These criteria can be seen as proxies of the extent to which firms are susceptible to the 
effects of information asymmetries, which translate themselves in difficulties in 
obtaining external funds
3 (i.e. as proxies for the degree of external financial 
constraints faced by the firms). 
On the other hand, the majority of studies that have found results in line with KZ 
(1997), classified firms or observations on the basis of indicators related to the level 
of internally generated funds available to them, which can be seen as a proxy for their 
degree of internal financial constraints
4. In particular, KZ (1997) based their sample 
separation criteria essentially on variables related to firms’ liquidity (which is 
obviously strongly correlated with the level of internal funds available to firms). 
Similarly, Cleary (1999) used a number of variables strongly related to firms’ internal 
funds (e.g. the current ratio, the coverage ratio etc.) to construct an index of firms’ 
financial strength
5. 
These considerations strongly suggest that internal and external financial 
constraints have different effects on the investment-cash flow relationship. One of the 
contributions of this paper is to investigate this issue more deeply.  
                                                 
3 Smaller and younger firms are particularly susceptible to information asymmetry effects, since little 
public information is available for them, and it is more difficult for financial institution to gather this 
information. Obtaining external finance is therefore likely to be particularly costly for smaller and 
younger firms (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Similarly, when seeking for external finance, firms with a 
low dividend-payout ratio are also likely to be subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
In an asymmetric information setting, dividends are in fact used by firms to convey information to 
shareholders, and more in general, to the outside world. Firms that pay high dividends signal that they 
have good long-term prospects, while the opposite holds for low-dividend paying firms (Bhattacharya, 
1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). Once again, obtaining external finance will be 
more difficult for the latter. Finally, variables such as access to the commercial paper market and bond 
rating are used because firms must reach a minimum size, collateral level, and age before the additional 
risk associated with information asymmetries is low enough to make bond issuance feasible or to 
obtain access to the commercial paper market (Calomiris et al., 1995). 
4 It has to be noted that the concepts of internal and external financial constraints are obviously related. 
A firm with greater internal cash flow is in fact likely to find it easier to obtain external finance, as it 
will be perceived as less risky by lenders. A high internal cash flow can in fact be seen as evidence of 
the firm’s managers’ commitment to their investment projects (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Conversely, 
firms that are internally financially constrained will find it more difficult to obtain external finance. 
5Exceptions are Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Cleary (2005) who estimated investment equations for a 
number of developed countries, and found that the sensitivities of investment to cash flow are often 
higher for larger firms and firms with higher dividend payout ratios. Yet, as discussed in Islam and 
Mozumdar (2002), their results are likely to be driven by insufficient cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
within-country samples.   5
The work of Cleary et al. (2004) is most clearly related to ours in that it also 
attempts to distinguish between the effects of internal and external financial 
constraints on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. However, our work differs 
from theirs in four important ways. First, and most importantly, while their sample is 
confined to quoted firms (in the United States), which are unlikely to display a wide 
enough range of financial constraints
6, ours also includes unquoted firms.  
Second, our paper is based on a sample from the United Kingdom. The relative 
lack of corporate bond and commercial paper markets, the relative thin and highly 
regulated banking and equity markets, and the relatively small amount of venture 
capital financing, seem to make the idea of financial constraints that affect firm 
behaviour more plausible in a European context
7. 
Third, we provide a richer analysis of the effects of internal and external 
constraints. Our analysis provides in fact estimates not only of the individual effects 
that internal and external financial constraints have on the sensitivities of firms’ 
investment to cash flow, but also of the effects of various combinations of these two 
types of constraints, trying to identify those combinations leading to higher 
sensitivities.  
Finally, instead of using a Q  model framework to estimate our investment 
regressions, we use error-correction specifications
8. The main advantage of using an 
error-correction model (ECM) is that it leads to a more flexible specification than the 
Q approach, which is consequently less likely to suffer from mis-specification 
problems. In particular, contrary to the Q model, the ECM specification maintains the 
long-run properties of value-maximising investment models, but does not impose the 
restrictions on short-run dynamics associated with particular adjustment cost 
specifications
9. Moreover, using the ECM specification allows us to by-pass to a 
                                                 
6 Cleary et al. (2004) state: “It is difficult to find good proxies for capital market imperfections that 
vary enough across observations in the sample (especially with Compustat data, where all firms are 
publicly traded).” (p. 30). 
7 Recent studies that looked at the effects of financial constraints on investment in the UK include 
Bond et al. (2004) and Carpenter and Guariglia (2003). For studies focusing on firm investment and 
monetary policy transmission in the Euro area, see Chatelain et al. (2003), and Part II of Angeloni et al. 
(2003). 
8 Given that our panel includes mainly unquoted firms, it would in fact be impossible to estimate a Q 
model, as Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the market value of the firm over the replacement value of its 
capital stock, cannot be calculated for unquoted firms. 
9 The Q model is in fact based on the assumption that adjustment costs are symmetric and quadratic. 
Yet, it is likely that adjustment costs take more complex forms. The Q model also imposes assumptions 
of perfect competition and constant return to scale, which might be inappropriate in some industrial 
sectors.   6
certain extent the criticism according to which cash flow might be an important 
determinant of investment, simply because it accounts for investment opportunities, 
which are poorly measured by Tobin’s Q
10. 
 
2.2  Theoretical arguments supporting a differential impact of internal and 
external financial constraints on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
Cleary et al. (2004) developed a model of the optimal level of a firm’s investment 
under financial constraints, distinguishing the latter into internal (i.e. based on the 
level of internal funds available to the firm) and external (i.e. based on the degree of 
capital market imperfections faced by the firm). 
Their model involves a firm with a given level of internal funds, which 
requires, at times, additional funds to finance its investment projects. Asymmetric 
information plays an important role in the model: the firm earns revenues that are not 
observable to external investors, generating a moral hazard problem. A debt contract 
is optimal in this setup. Default on a promised repayment may be followed by 
liquidation of the firm
11. Consequently, external funds are more expensive than 
internal funds.  
Cleary et al.’s (2004) model develops previous theories (e.g. Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989, 1999; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990; 
Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Hart and Moore, 1998, etc.) in three significant ways. The 
first is by assuming that investment is scalable, i.e. that firms not only make the 
decision of whether to undertake an investment project, but can also decide the scale 
of their investment. The firm’s optimal level of investment depends therefore on the 
marginal cost of external funds. The second way in which Cleary et al.’s (2004) 
model extends previous theories is by allowing negative levels of internal funds. The 
third is by determining the cost of borrowing funds endogenously
12. 
                                                 
10 A further challenge to FHP (1988) came in fact with Bond and Cummins (2001), Bond et al. (2004), 
and Oliner et al. (2005). Based on the Q  model framework, these authors estimated equations of 
investment, using firm-specific earnings forecasts from securities analysts as measures of the 
fundamentals affecting the expected returns on investment. They found that when they controlled for 
expected profitability by using analysts’ earnings forecasts, the correlation between investment 
spending and cash flow disappeared in all sub-samples of firms. Similar results were obtained by 
Erickson and Whited (2000) who regressed investment on a measure of Q adjusted for measurement 
error, and cash flow. 
11 Given that the firm’s revenue is unobservable, the threat of liquidation is necessary to induce the firm 
to repay the investor. 
12 This is ensured by explicitly considering the investors’ participation constraint. Cleary et al.’s (2004) 
model differs from existing theories mainly because all the three above mentioned assumptions hold   7
  The trade-off between a cost and a revenue effect generates the main 
prediction of the model, i.e. that the investment-cash flow relationship is U-shaped. 
The cost effect arises because higher levels of investment are associated with higher 
repayment costs, a higher risk of default, and consequently a higher marginal cost of 
debt finance. This effect suggests a positive relationship between cash flow and 
investment. On the other hand, a revenue effect occurs because a higher level of 
investment generates higher revenue, which lowers the firm’s risk of default and its 
marginal cost of debt finance. This effect suggests a negative relationship between 
cash flow and investment. The U-shaped relationship between investment and cash 
flow arises from the fact that the revenue effect is most powerful when cash flow is 
sufficiently negative, so that the survival of the firm is in doubt
13. Otherwise the cost 
effect dominates. 
Furthermore, according to Cleary et al.’s (2004) model, when those firms for 
which the cost effect dominates are classified according to the degree of external 
financial constraints that they face (i.e. on the basis of criteria such as size, age, their 
dividend-payout ratio or bond rating), then it is the most constrained firms which 
should display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities. 
 
3.  Main features of the data and summary statistics 
3.1  The data set 
We construct our data set from the profit and loss and balance sheet data gathered by 
Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) 
database. This provides information on companies for the period 1993-2003
14. Over 99 
percent of the firms in the data set are not traded on the stock market
15. Having access 
to financial variables for unquoted firms provides a unique opportunity to test the 
                                                                                                                                            
simultaneously in their model. Other theories are based on one or two of the three assumptions, but 
never on all three contemporaneously (for instance, in Bernanke et al., 1999, investment is considered 
as scalable, but internal funds are not permitted to be negative). 
13 For firms in this situation, a large share of any loan would have to be used to pay existing debts or 
cover fixed costs, i.e. to try and make cash flow positive. Therefore, in the presence of a falling cash 
flow, these firms would have to increase their investment, in order to generate sufficient revenue to 
achieve this goal. 
14 A maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at once. Our data were 
downloaded early in 2004: the coverage period is therefore 1993-2003. 
15 We only selected firms that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that the majority of the firms 
in our data set are relatively small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of firms belonging to 
groups, which would be included in the data set if firms with consolidated accounts were also part of it.   8
financing constraints hypothesis
16. This is because unquoted firms are obviously more 
likely to be characterized by adverse financial attributes such as a short track record, 
poor solvency, and low real assets compared to the quoted firms, which are typically 
large, financially healthy, long-established companies with good credit ratings. Unlike 
previous studies, our data allows us therefore to find proxies for financial constraints, 
characterized by a wide range of variation across observations in the sample. 
The firms in our data set operate in all industrial sectors. This is also beneficial 
for us: the majority of studies that looked at the effects of financial constraints on 
firms’ activities have in fact focused essentially on the manufacturing sector
17. Yet, as 
explained in Bernanke et al. (1996), the share of sales by “small” firms is generally 
greater in other sectors.  
We measure investment as the purchase of fixed tangible assets by the firm. 
Cash flow is obtained as the sum of the firm’s after-tax profits and depreciation. Our 
measure of the replacement value of capital stock is derived from the book value of 
the firm’s stock of tangible assets, using the investment data in a standard perpetual 
inventory formula. 
We excluded companies that changed the date of their accounting year-end by 
more than a few weeks, so that the data refer to 12 month accounting periods. Firms 
that did not have complete records on investment, cash flow, or sales were also 
dropped, as well as firms with less than 3 years of continuous observations
18. Finally, 
to control for the potential influence of outliers, we excluded observations in the 1% 
tails for each of the regression variables
19. These types of rules are common in the 
literature and we employ them to ensure comparability with previous work (Bond et 
al., 2003; Oliner et al., 2005).  
                                                 
16 According to this hypothesis, if a financially constrained firm has a higher cash flow, then it will be 
able to afford to invest more and will do so. On the other hand, if an unconstrained firm has a higher 
cash flow, then its investment behavior is unlikely to change as this firm could have invested more 
anyway by using external sources of finance. 
17 A few exceptions are Schaller (1993) who estimated investment equations for manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing Canadian firms; Calem and Rizzo (1995) who focused on the US hospital industry; 
Zakrajsek (1997) and Benito (2005) who looked at inventory investment in the retail sector, 
respectively in the US, and in the UK and Spain; and Cleary (1999) and Cleary et al. (2004) who 
estimated investment equations for the entire US economy. To ensure comparability with the literature, 
in our empirical analysis, we will present separate results for manufacturing firms and for firms 
operating in the entire economy. 
18 At least three consecutive observations are needed for each firm, because our model will be 
estimated in first-differences using lagged values (dated t-2 and before) of the endogenous variables as 
instruments (see Section 4.2 for more details on our estimation methodology). 
19 More specifically, these cut-offs are aimed at eliminating observations reflecting particularly large 
mergers, extraordinary firm shocks, or coding errors.   9
The data sets that we use in estimation include a total of 39270 annual 
observations on 7534 companies, when we only focus on the manufacturing sector; 
and 124590 annual observations on 24184 companies, when we focus on the entire 
economy. Both samples cover the years 1996-2003 and have an unbalanced structure, 
with the number of years of observations on each firm varying between 3 and 8
20. By 
allowing for both entry and exit, the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates 
potential selection and survivor bias. 
 
3.2  Sample separation criteria 
We use the level of cash flow available to firms as a proxy for the degree of internal 
financial constraints that they face
21. Similarly, we consider the firms’ size and age as 
proxies for the degree of external financial constraints that they face.  
We first test whether cash flow has a differential impact on the investment of 
firms with different degrees of internal financial constraints. For this purpose, as in 
Cleary et al. (2004), we initially split firms on the basis of their cash flow to capital 
ratio. We therefore construct the following dummy variables: 
i.  NEGCFit, which is equal to 1 if firm i has a negative cash flow to capital 
ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise; 
ii.  MEDIUMCFit, which is equal to 1 if firm i has a positive cash flow to 
capital ratio in year t, which falls below the 75
th percentile of the distribution 
of the corresponding ratios of all the firms operating in the same industry as 
firm i in that particular year, and equal to 0, otherwise; 
iii.  HIGHCFit, which is equal to 1 if firm i displays a positive cash flow to 
capital ratio in year t, which falls above the 75
th percentile of the distribution 
                                                 
20 See Appendix 1 for more information on the structure of our panel and more complete definitions of 
all variables used. Also note that because our estimation methodology (described below) uses lagged 
variables as instruments, the first three cross-sections of the data are used to construct the instruments: 
for this reason, although our original data set covers the period 1993-2003, the data set actually used in 
estimation only covers the years 1996-2003. 
21 It is a sensible choice to use cash flow as a proxy for internal funds for two main reasons. First, cash 
flow can take negative values. This is particularly important as according to Cleary et al.’s (2004) 
theory, it is for those firms whose internal funds are sufficiently negative, that the revenue effect 
dominates, leading to a negative relationship between investment and internal funds. Second, cash flow 
has been widely used in the investment literature as a measure of internal funds (see Shiantarelli, 1995; 
Hubbard et al., 1998, and Bond and Van Reenen, 2005). Yet, cash flow is not a perfect measure of 
internal funds because it is a flow variable, which does not include the stock of funds accumulated in 
the past. One can, however, claim that since cash flow is the main source of variation in internal funds, 
firms with negative cash flow are likely to have a low or negative level of internal funds (Cleary et al., 
2004).   10
of the corresponding ratios of all the firms operating in the same industry as 
firm i in that particular year, and equal to 0, otherwise.  
We use these dummies in our investment regressions as interactions on the cash flow 
term
22. In this way, we allow firms to transit between classes
23. 
To check robustness, we also use firms’ financial status dummies defined in a 
similar way as above, but based on their coverage ratio (NEGCOVit; MEDCOVit, 
HIGHCOVit). The coverage ratio is defined as the ratio between firms’ total profits 
before tax and before interest and their total interest payments, and indicates the 
availability of internal funds that firms can use to finance their real activities
24. As the 
coverage ratio has been widely used in the literature on the effects of financial 
constraints on firms’ activities (see Carpenter et al., 1998; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; 
Guariglia and Schiantarelli, 1998; Guariglia, 1999, 2000; and Whited, 1992), we have 
decided to use this variable as our second measure of firms’ internal funds, instead of 
the working capital to capital ratio, which was used by Cleary et al. (2004). 
We then investigate whether cash flow has a different impact on the 
investment of firms facing different degrees of external financial constraints. For this 
purpose, we first partition firms on the basis of their size, measured by their total real 
assets. Smaller firms are likely to face more severe problems of asymmetric 
information as they are more likely to suffer from idiosyncratic risk, and to have 
lower collateral values relative to their liabilities, as well as higher bankruptcy costs, 
and short track records (Schiantarelli, 1995). Each year, we consider a firm’s size 
relative to the situation of other firms in the industry in which that firm operates. We 
define as small firm-years (SMALLit=1) within an industry, those firms whose real 
assets in year t are in the lowest quartiles of the distribution of the assets of all the 
firms in that particular industry and year. Similarly, we define as medium-sized firm-
years (MEDIUMit=1) within an industry, those firms whose real assets in year t fall in 
the second and third quartiles of the distribution. Finally, large firm-years 
(LARGEit=1) are those firm-years with assets in the highest quartile of the 
distribution.  
                                                 
22 The equations that we estimate are described in detail in Section 4.1. 
23 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on firm-years rather than simply firms. See Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997), Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1998), and Guariglia (2000) for a similar approach. 
24 More specifically, the coverage ratio is a measurement of the number of times a company could 
make its interest payments with its earnings before interest and taxes.   11
To check robustness, we also define the degree of asymmetric information 
faced by our firms in capital markets on the basis of their age
25. Younger firms are 
more likely to face problems of asymmetric information, as their short track record 
makes it more difficult to judge their quality. We consider as young firm-years 
(YOUNGit=1) within an industry, those firms whose age in year t falls in the lowest 
quartiles of the distribution of the ages of all the firms in that particular industry and 
year. Similarly, we define as middle-aged firm-years (MIDDLEAGEDit=1) within an 
industry, those firms whose age in year t is in the second and third quartiles of the 
distribution. Finally, old firm-years (OLDit=1) are those with age in the highest 
quartile of the distribution. In all cases, we interact the constructed dummies with the 




3.3 Summary  statistics 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables used in our 
regressions. Panel A refers to the manufacturing sector only, whereas Panel B refers 
to the entire economy. In both panels of the Table, column (1) refers to the full 
sample, columns (2) to (4), to the sub-samples based on the cash flow to capital ratio, 
and columns (5) to (7), to the sub-samples based on firms’ size
27.  
  We can see from both panels of the Table, that when firm-years are classified 
on the basis of their cash flow to capital ratio, both the investment to capital ratio, and 
sales growth tend to rise monotonically as we move from firm-years with negative 
cash flow to firm-years with high cash flow. On the other hand, assets tend to be 
highest for those firm-years in the middle category. When firm-years are divided on 
the basis of their assets, it is the smallest firm-years which tend to have the highest 
investment to capital ratios, as well as the highest cash flow to capital ratios.  
  Table 2 presents the behaviour of investment to capital ratios for different 
percentiles of the cash flow to capital ratio. Columns (1) and (2) refer to the 
manufacturing sector and columns (3) and (4), to the entire economy. In both cases, 
we can see that the investment-cash flow relationship is U-shaped: the investment to 
                                                 
25 Age is defined as the time elapsed from the incorporation date of the company. 
26 Due to data constraints, we could not use the dividend payout ratio as a sample separation criterion. 
27 Summary statistics relative to the sub-samples based on the coverage ratio and on firms’ age are 
reported in Table A1 in Appendix 2.    12
capital ratios reach in fact a minimum when the cash flow to capital ratio is around 0, 
and then increase both when cash flow becomes negative, and when it rises above 0.  
  It is noteworthy that the percentage of firm-years with negative cash flow is 
12.9% in our manufacturing sector sample, and 12.7% in our entire economy 
sample
28. The corresponding percentages for small, medium, and large firm-years are 
14.5%, 12.7%, 12.6%; and 13.5%, 12.8%, 12.4%, respectively for the manufacturing 
sector and the entire economy. It appears therefore that the splits of firm-years on the 
basis of the cash flow to capital ratio and real assets are not strongly correlated, as a 
similar percentage of firms with negative cash flow can be found among the small, 
medium, and large firm-years, and as real assets do not grow monotonically with cash 
flow. Dividing firm-years on the basis of their cash flow to capital ratio and on the 
basis of their assets, will therefore not necessarily lead to equal patterns of the 
investment-cash flow sensitivities for financially constrained and unconstrained firm-
years. In the section that follows, we will provide formal tests of how the sensitivities 
change with the degree of internal and external financial constraints faced by firms. 
 
4.  Baseline specification and estimation methodology 
4.1 Baseline  specification 
We initially estimate the following error-correction specification (see Bond et al., 
2003, for a similar specification): 
Iit /Ki(t-1) = a0 + a1Ii(t-1)/Ki(t-2) + a2∆sit + a3∆si(t-1) + a4(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) +  
+a5 CFit /Ki(t-1) + vi + vt + vjt + eit      (1) 
where I is the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of its capital stock, and k, 
its logarithm; s, the logarithm of real sales; and CF, the firm’s cash flow. The 
subscript i indexes firms; j, industries
29; and t, time, where t=1996-2003.  
                                                 
28 A negative cash flow might be caused by significant fixed costs paid for instance to undertake some 
large investment project. Alternatively, it might be caused by the failure of a R&D project, as the latter 
projects are typically very risky (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b). Within the manufacturing sector, the 
majority of firms with negative cash flow can be found in the following sectors: metals and metal 
goods; chemicals; electrical engineering; and others. The former three are typically R&D intensive 
sectors.  
29 When only the manufacturing sector is considered, firms are allocated to one of the following nine 
industrial sectors: metals and metal goods; other minerals, and mineral products; chemicals and man 
made fibres; mechanical engineering; electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles and parts, 
other transport equipment; food, drink, and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear; and others 
(Blundell et al., 1992). When the entire economy is considered, firms are allocated to the following 
seven groups: agriculture, forestry, and mining; manufacturing; construction; retail and wholesale; 
hotels and restaurants; business services; others (which include education, health, social work, repairs   13
Error-correction behaviour enters the empirical framework because of 
adjustment costs. In their presence the firm will not immediately adjust its capital 
stock (k) to the target level (s), which is assumed to be a function of sales. We specify 
a dynamic adjustment mechanism between k and s (the details of which are contained 
in Appendix 3). To be consistent with error-correction behaviour, the coefficient 
associated with the term (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) should be negative: if capital is lower (higher) 
than its desired level, future investment should in fact be higher (lower).  
The error term in Equation (1) is made up of four components: vi, which is a 
firm-specific component; vt, a time-specific component accounting for possible 
business cycle effects; vjt, a time-specific component which varies across industries, 
accounting for industry-specific shifts in investment demand or expectations 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a; and Carpenter and Guariglia, 2003); and eit, an 
idiosyncratic component. We control for vi  by estimating our equations in first-
differences, for vt by including time dummies, and for vjt by including industry 
dummies interacted with time dummies in all our specifications.  
When focusing on the differential impact of cash flow on the investment of 
different categories of firms, instead of estimating our investment equations on 
separate sub-samples of firms as in Cleary et al. (2004), we interact the cash flow 
variable in all our specifications with dummy variables indicating the degree of 
internal and external financial constraints faced by the firm. This approach allows us 
to avoid problems of endogenous sample selection; to gain degrees of freedom; and to 
take into consideration the fact that firms can transit between groups. We estimate 
equations of the type: 
Iit /Ki(t-1) = a0 + a1Ii(t-1)/Ki(t-2) + a2∆sit + a3∆si(t-1) + a4(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) +  
+a51 [CFit /Ki(t-1)*CATEGORY1it] + a52 [CFit /Ki(t-1)*CATEGORY2it] +  
a53 [CFit /Ki(t-1)*CATEGORY3it] + vi + vt + vjt + eit,    (2) 
where CATEGORY1it, CATEGORY2it, and CATEGORY3it refer in turn to the dummy 
variables based on the firms’ cash flow to capital ratio (NEGCFit,  MEDCFit, 
HIGHCFit); to those based on their coverage ratio (NEGCOVit,  MEDCOVit; 
                                                                                                                                            
entertaining, and renting). Following Cleary (1999), the following industries are omitted from the 
analysis: finance, insurance, and real estate; transport, communication, electricity, gas, sanitary 
services; and public administration.   14
HIGHCOVit); on their size (SMALLit,  MEDIUMit;  LARGEit); and on their age 
(YOUNGit, MIDDLEAGEDit, OLDit).  
 
4.2 Estimation  methodology 
We estimate Equations (1) and (2) using a first-difference Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) specification
30. This technique takes unobserved firm heterogeneity 
into account by estimating the equation in first-differences, and controls for possible 
endogeneity problems by using the model variables lagged two or more periods as 
instruments
31.  
In order to evaluate whether our model is correctly specified, we use two 
criteria: the Sargan test (also known as J test) and the test for second-order serial 
correlation of the residuals in the differenced equation (m2). If the model is correctly 
specified, the variables in the instrument set should be uncorrelated with the error 
term in Equations (1) and (2). The J statistic tests overidentifying restrictions. Under 
the null of instrument validity, it is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters. 
The m2 test is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no 
second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a further 
                                                 
30 See Arellano and Bond (1991, 1998) on the application of the GMM approach to panel data. The 
program DPD for OX will be used in estimation (Doornik et al., 2003). 
31 An alternative estimator which could be used is the GMM system estimator, which combines in a 
system the original specification expressed in first-differences and in levels. This estimator, developed 
in Blundell and Bond (1998) is used when the simple first-differenced GMM estimator suffers from 
serious finite small sample biases. This generally occurs when the instruments used with the standard 
first-differenced GMM estimator (i.e. the endogenous variables lagged two or more periods) are not 
very informative, which is often the case in autoregressive models with persistent series, and in models 
where the variance of the fixed-effects is particularly high relative to the variance of the transitory 
shocks. A way to detect whether the simple first-differenced GMM estimator is affected by these finite 
sample biases is to compare the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable obtained 
from the latter estimator with those obtained from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the within-
groups estimators. As the OLS estimate is upward biased, whereas the within-groups estimate is 
downward biased, one would expect a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable to lie in between these two estimates. Should one find that the estimate obtained using the 
first-differenced GMM estimator lies close or below the within-groups estimate, then one could suspect 
the GMM estimate to be downward biased as well, possibly due to weak instruments (see Bond et al., 
2001, for further discussion on this point). We therefore estimated Equation (1) using OLS, the within-
groups estimator, and the GMM first-difference estimators. The coefficients associated with the lagged 
dependent variable were respectively 0.05, -0.33, and -0.09, when only the manufacturing sector was 
considered; and 0.04, -0.31, and -0.06, when the entire economy was considered. Because in both 
cases, the GMM first-difference estimate comfortably lies between the OLS and the within-groups 
estimates, we can conclude that the GMM first-difference estimates are unlikely to be subject to serious 
finite sample biases. Consequently, we do not report the estimates based on the system-GMM 
estimator. These, as well as the OLS and within-groups estimates, are however available from the 
authors upon request.   15
check on the specification of the model and on the legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as 
instruments in the differenced equation
32. 
 
5. Empirical  results 
5.1 Investment  equations  without interactions 
Table 3 presents the estimates of Equation (1). Column (1) refers to the full 
manufacturing sector sample. As expected the error-correction term attracts a negative 
sign, and the sales growth terms are both positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient associated with the cash flow to capital ratio, 0.055, suggests that cash 
flow plays a positive and statistically significant effect on investment. Neither the 
Sargan test, nor the m2 test for second-order autocorrelation of the differenced 
residuals indicate problems with the specification of the model or the choice of the 
instruments. 
Column (2) reports the estimates relative to the full sample, for the entire 
economy. Once again, the coefficient associated with cash flow (0.038) is positive 
and precisely determined. Compared to the manufacturing sector, however, cash flow 
has a weaker effect on firms’ investment. This might be explained by the fact that 
agency costs are more substantive for manufacturing firms, as their assets are “more 
specialized” and can less readily “serve as collateral” (Schaller, 1993). 
In columns (3) and (4), we present the estimates of similar equations on 
samples, which exclude observations with negative cash flow to capital ratio
33. For 
the manufacturing sector (column 3), the coefficient associated with the cash flow 
variable is now 0.085, whereas the corresponding coefficient for the entire economy is 
0.043 (column 4). Both coefficients are precisely determined, and larger than those 
reported in columns (1) and (2), although the difference in the coefficients relative to 
the entire economy is rather small. This finding suggests that the observations with 
negative cash flow have lower (and possibly negative) investment-cash flow 
sensitivities than the other observations
34. 
                                                 
32 If the undifferenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order, but 
not second-order serial correlation. Note that neither the J test nor the m2 test allow to discriminate 
between bad instruments and model specification.  
33 Note that in some cases, after deleting observations with negative cash flow, a number of firms 
ended up having less than 3 observations. These firms were consequently deleted from the sample. 
34 Alayannis and Mozumdar (2004) also found that deleting from the sample observations with 
negative cash flow raised the coefficient on cash flow in their investment regressions.   16
Next, we will evaluate how exactly the investment-cash flow sensitivities 
differ across various sub-groups of firm-years. 
 
5.2  Investment equations with interactions based on the degree of internal 
financial constraints faced by firms  
Table 4 presents the estimates of Equation (2), where the interaction terms are based 
on the cash flow to capital ratio (columns 1 and 2, respectively for the manufacturing 
sector and the entire economy), and on the coverage ratio (columns 3 and 4, 
respectively for the manufacturing sector and the entire economy). Focusing on 
columns (1) and (2), we can see that the coefficient associated with cash flow is 
negative for firm-years with negative cash flow. Referring to the theoretical model 
described in Section 2.2, this can be explained considering that, for these firms, the 
revenue effect prevails over the cost effect: as cash flow falls, these firms have in fact 
to increase their investment in order to be able to deal with their financing gap, and to 
pay back their lenders. Columns (1) and (2) also suggest that cash flow does not have 
a precisely determined effect on the investment of those firm-years characterized by a 
moderate level of cash flow to capital. On the other hand, it plays a positive and 
significant effect on the investment of firm-years with high cash flow. These results 
are consistent with the idea that the relationship between investment and cash flow is 
U-shaped. They are also in line with the findings in KZ (1997), according to which 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is highest for the least financially 
constrained firms.  
  When the coverage ratio is used to differentiate the effects of cash flow on 
firms’ investment, similar results as above take place in the manufacturing sector 
(column 3). Yet, when the entire economy is considered (column 4), cash flow attracts 
a positive and significant coefficient both for firm-years with middle-sized and high 
coverage ratio. 
 
5.3  Investment equations with interactions based on the degree of external 
financial constraints faced by firms 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimates of Equation (2) when firm-years are 
differentiated into small, medium, and large (columns 1 and 2, respectively for the 
manufacturing sector, and the entire economy) and into young, middle-aged, and old   17
(columns 3 and 4, respectively for the manufacturing sector and the entire economy), 
i.e. on the basis of the degree of external financial constraints that they face.  
In column (1), both small and medium-sized firm-years display a positive and 
precisely determined sensitivity of investment to cash flow, larger for the former 
(0.10) than for the latter (0.05). A similar pattern can be observed in column (2), 
where the coefficients are respectively 0.08 and 0.03 for small and medium-sized 
firm-years. For large firm-years, the coefficient associated with cash flow is poorly 
determined in both columns. 
  When firm-years are split on the basis of their age (columns 3 and 4), the 
coefficients associated with cash flow are once again only significant for the youngest 
and middle-aged firm years, and generally larger for the former.  
It appears therefore that, although also significant for middle-sized and 
middle-aged firm-years, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is larger for the 
smallest and youngest firm-years, which are more prone to facing asymmetric 
information problems. The estimates in this Table are in line with the findings in FHP 
(1988), according to which firms more likely to face financial constraints exhibit 
higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow
35.  
These findings have significant policy implications: the fact that smaller and 
younger firms exhibit a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow suggests that in 
order to make the small business community thrive, policies aimed at making the 




5.4  Summary 
Overall, our results, based on a panel which includes a large number of unquoted UK 
firms over the period 1996-2003, can be summarized as follows. When firm-years are 
split on the basis of their level of internal funds, then those characterized by negative 
levels of these internal funds generally display a negative sensitivity of investment to 
                                                 
35 The fact that in this Table the investment-cash flow sensitivities are never negative and precisely 
determined can be explained by the fact that the percentage of firms with negative cash flow is 
relatively small in all sub-groups of firms. Thus, in all sub-groups, the cost effect is likely to prevail 
over the revenue effect. 
36 In a recent report, the Government and Accountants Working Group (2004) states: “A thriving 
economy needs a thriving small business community and being able to access the right type of finance 
at the appropriate time is a crucial ingredient underpinning business success”. Similarly, according to 
Bank of England (2004): “Ensuring that there is efficient intermediation of funds to small firms, based 
on a good understanding of risks and returns, is thus an important public policy objective”.   18
cash flow, whereas those classified as having a middle-sized level of internal funds, 
exhibit a non-significant sensitivity, and those with high internal funds, a positive and 
precisely determined sensitivity. These results suggest that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between investment and cash flow. They are also in line with KZ (1997) 
and Cleary et al. (2004).  
On the other hand, when firm-years are split on the basis of the degree of 
external financial constraints that they face, we find that the relationship between 
investment and cash flow is generally non-negative and monotonically increasing 
with the degree of the constraints. These results are in line with the empirical results 
in FHP (1988)
37.  
These results suggest that the different conclusions reached by FHP (1988) 
and KZ (1997) about whether higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow can be 
interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially constrained, are probably due 
to the to the different criteria used in their studies to partition their sample. 
  We next analyze the sensitivities of investment to cash flow when the sample 
is split on the basis of combinations of various degrees of internal and external 
financial constraints. 
 
5.5 Investment  equations  with interactions based on various combinations of 
internal and external financial constraints faced by firms 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 present the results of the estimation of Equation (1) 
when the effects of cash flow on investment are differentiated across firm-years 
facing various combinations of internal and external financial constraints, i.e. small, 
medium, and large firm-years with negative cash flow; small, medium, and large 
firm-years with medium cash flow; and small, medium, and large firm-years with 
high cash flow. 
  Column (1) reports the estimates relative to the manufacturing sector. It 
appears that cash flow attracts a positive and statistically significant effect only for 
those small and medium-sized firm-years with relatively high cash flow. The 
coefficient for the former (0.14) is higher than that for the latter (0.09), and higher 
                                                 
37 All our results were generally robust to interacting all the regressors with the dummies relative to the 
level of internal funds available to the firms, or the dummies relative to the degree of asymmetric 
information faced by the firms. We also estimated more general versions of Equation (2) which 
included two of the CATEGORY dummies. Since the latter variables were never precisely determined,   19
than the corresponding coefficient on cash flow for small firm-years reported in 
column (1) of Table 5 (0.10). The J and m2 tests do not indicate problems with the 
specification of the model and/or the instruments chosen.  
  Column (2) reports the estimates for the entire economy. Once again, it is the 
small firm-years with relatively high cash flow that display the highest sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow (0.07). As in column (1), cash flow attracts a positive and 
significant coefficient also for the medium-sized firm-years with relatively high cash 
flow. This coefficient (0.04) is however smaller than that for small firm-years. 
Finally, in this specification, we can also observe a negative and significant 
coefficient for medium-sized firm-years with negative cash flow. 
  Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 presents robustness tests in which cash flow 
and size are respectively replaced with the coverage ratio and age as sample 
separation criteria. Column (3) presents estimates for the manufacturing sector. Like 
in column (1), it is only those young and middle-aged firm-years with relatively high 
coverage ratio that display positive and significant sensitivities of investment to cash 
flow. The sensitivities amount to 0.16 and 0.09 respectively for the two types of firm-
years. Column (4) refers to the entire economy. The results are similar to those 
reported in column (2). 
  The results in this Table can be interpreted as follows. As external and internal 
financial constraints often have opposite effects on the sensitivities of investment to 
cash flow, when the two types of constraints are combined, the sensitivities are the 
highest when the two types of constraints affect firms’ investment in the same 
direction. As high cash flow firm-years have the highest sensitivities when firm-years 
are split on the basis of the degree of internal financial constraints that they face 
(Table 4), and small and medium-sized firm-years display the highest sensitivities 
when a split based on the degree of external financial constraints is used (Table 5), it 
is not surprising to see that it is those firm-years that are both constrained externally, 
and unconstrained internally, which display the highest sensitivities.  
The fact that investment at firm-years which are constrained both internally 
and externally does not seem to be affected by cash flow can be explained considering 
that negative cash flow leads to negative sensitivities, whereas being small leads to 
positive sensitivities. These two contrasting effects are likely to offset each other, 
                                                                                                                                            
we omitted them from our preferred specification. The inclusion of the dummies did not change the   20
leading to a poorly determined coefficient for small firm-years with negative cash-
flow. From an economic viewpoint, this result could also be explained considering 
that small firm-years with negative cash flow are particularly likely to be financially 
distressed. They might therefore have reached the minimum level of investment 
necessary to carry on production: further reductions in investment would therefore be 
impossible, even in response to declines in cash flow. Financially distressed firms 
might also be required by their creditors to use their cash flow to meet interest 
payments and/or improve the liquidity of their balance sheet (Fazzari et al., 2000; 
Huang, 2002; Allayannis and Monumbar, 2004; Cleary et al., 2004).  
Finally, the fact that investment at firm-years with medium-sized cash flow 
does not seem to be affected by changes in cash flow, whatever the degree of external 
financial constraints faced by the firms can be explained considering that having a 
medium-sized cash flow generally leads to a poorly determined sensitivity. It is 
possible that this effect prevails over the positive effect that being externally 
financially constrained should play on the sensitivities.  
In the light of these results, in order to make an economy thrive, public 
policies should endeavour to make access to finance easier especially for those SMEs 
characterized by relatively high levels of internal funds. It is in fact only those SMEs 
that will convert this additional finance into additional investment. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have tested whether internal and external financial constraints faced 
by firms have different effects on their sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Our test 
is based on a panel of UK firms, operating in all industrial sectors, a large number of 
which are unquoted. This allows our measures of financial constraints to display a 
wide degree of variation across observations. Furthermore, instead of using the 
traditional Q-model of investment in estimation, we have used an error-correction 
specification, which allows us to by-pass to a certain extent the criticism according to 
which cash flow might affect investment, simply because it picks up investment 
opportunities, not properly accounted for by Q. Finally, in addition to analyzing how 
the sensitivities of investment to cash flow differ at firms facing different degrees of 
internal financial constraints on the one hand, and different degrees of external 
                                                                                                                                            
magnitude and significance of the coefficients associated with the other regressors.   21
financial constraints, on the other, we have also focused on the effects of various 
combinations of internal and external financial constraints on the sensitivities, trying 
to identify the combinations leading to the highest sensitivities. 
Our results, which are generally robust to considering only the manufacturing 
sector or the entire economy, suggest that when the sample is split on the basis of the 
level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between investment and 
cash flow is U-shaped. On the other hand, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external financial constraints faced 
by firms. These findings suggest that the different conclusions reached by FHP (1988) 
and KZ (1997) about whether higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow can be 
interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially constrained, are probably due 
to the to the different criteria used in their studies to partition their sample.  
Finally, combining the internal with the external financial constraints, we find that 
the sensitivities are the highest for those externally financially constrained firms that 
have a relatively high level of internal funds. The latter result is particularly important 
from a policy viewpoint: it suggests in fact that policies aimed at increasing a nation’s 
investment should make the access to finance easier especially for those SMEs with a 
sufficiently high level of internal funds. 
Whether similar patterns also hold when one focuses on other types of firms’ 
activities such as inventory investment, R&D, or employment, remains an open 
question, which is on the agenda for future research.   22
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Definitions of the variables used: 
Investment. It is constructed as the difference between the book value of tangible 
fixed assets (which include land and building; fixtures and fittings; and plant and 
vehicles) of end of year t and end of year t-1 adding depreciation of year t. 
 
Replacement value of the capital stock. It is calculated using the perpetual inventory 
formula (Blundell et al., 1992; Mizen and Vermeulen, 2005). We use tangible fixed 
assets as the historic value of the capital stock. We assume that replacement cost and 
historic cost are the same in the first year of data for each firm. We then apply the 
perpetual inventory formula as follows:  
replacement value of capital stock at time t+1 =  
replacement value at time t*(1-dep)*(pt+1 /pt )+ investment at time t+1,    23
where dep represents the depreciation rate, which we assume to be constant and equal 
to 5.5% for all firms; and pt is the price of investment goods, which we proxy with the 
implicit deflator for gross fixed capital formation.  
 
Cash flow. It is defined as the sum of after tax profit and depreciation. 
 
Coverage ratio. It is defined as the ratio between the firm’s total profits before tax and 
before interest and its total interest payments. 
 
Total assets. It is defined as the sum of fixed assets and current assets. 
 
Deflators.  Investment, the capital stock, and contracted capital expenditures are 
deflated using the implicit price deflator for gross fixed capital formation. Other 
variables are deflated using the aggregate GDP deflator. 
 
Appendix 2: Additional summary statistics 
Table A1 presents the mean and standard deviations of the variables used in our 
regressions when firm-years are split on the basis of their coverage ratio and their age. 
Panel A refers to the manufacturing sector, and Panel B to the entire economy. 
 
Appendix 3: The error-correction model 
The error-correction model for investment was initially proposed by Bean (1981). It 
has been subsequently used by Hall et al. (1999), Bond et al. (2003), and Mizen and 
Vermeulen (2005) to test the financing constraints hypothesis
38.  
In order to derive Equation (1) in the main text, we initially assume that in the 
absence of adjustment costs or barriers to immediate adjustment, the firm’s desired 
capital stock takes the form: 
kit = sit - σjit + vi,            ( A . 1 )  
where kit represents the logarithm of the firms’ capital stock; sit, the logarithm of the 
firms’ sales; jit, the real user cost of capital; and vi, a firm-specific effect
39.  
                                                 
38 This Appendix draws on Hall et al. (1999) and Bond et al. (2003). 
39 As discussed in Hall et al. (1999) and Bond et al. (2003), this is consistent with a neoclassical model 
of a profit maximizing firm, with no adjustment costs, a single type of capital, and a CES or Cobb-
Douglas production function.    24
  Yet, in the presence of adjustment costs, the firm will not be able to 
immediately adjust its capital stock to the target level. We therefore specify a dynamic 
adjustment mechanism between k and s as an autoregressive-distributed lag of length 
two, in which Equation (A.1) is nested as a long-run equilibrium. Also assuming that 
all variations in the user cost of capital are subsumed in the time-specific components 
of the error term, we obtain: 
kit = α1ki(t-1) + α2ki(t-2) + α3sit + α4si(t-1) + α5si(t-2) + vi + vt + vjt + eit,   (A.2) 
where vi is a firm-specific effect; vt, a time-specific component; vjt, a time-specific 
effect that varies across industries; and eit, an idiosyncratic error term. Re-
parameterizing this model in an error-correction form, and imposing the restriction 
that in the long-run (α3 + α4 + α5)/(1- α1- α2) is equal to 1
40, we obtain: 
∆kit = (α1-1)si(t-1) + α3 ∆sit + (α3 + α4) ∆si(t-1) - (1- α1- α2) (ki(t-2)-si(t-2))+  
+ vi +  vt + vjt + eit.           ( A . 3 )  
Using the approximation ∆kit  ≈Iit /Ki(t-1) - δi, where δi stands for firm-specific 
depreciation and is subsumed in the vi component of the error term, and including the 
cash flow to capital ratio to capture effects associated with financial constraints, 
yields Equation (1) in the text. To be consistent with error-correction behavior, the 
coefficient associated with the term (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) should be negative: if capital is lower 
(higher) than its desired level, future investment should in fact be higher (lower). 
 
References 
Allayannis, G. and A. Mozumdar (2004). “The Impact of Negative Cash Flow and 
Influential Observations on Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Estimates.” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 5, 901-930. 
Angeloni, I., Kashyap, A., and B. Mojon (eds.) (2003). Monetary Policy Transmission 
in the Euro Area. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1998). “Dynamic Panel Data Estimation using DPD98 for 
GAUSS.” Mimeograph, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London (1998). 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.” Review of 
Economic Studies, 58, 277-97. 
Bank of England (2004). “Finance for Small Firms”, March 2004. 
                                                 
40 This restriction ensures that in the long-run, returns to scale are constant.   25
Bean, C. (1981). “An Econometric Model of Manufacturing Investment in the UK.” 
Economic Journal, 91, 106-21. 
Benito, A. (2005). “Financial Pressure, Monetary Policy Effects and Inventories: 
Firm-level Evidence from a Market-based and a Bank-based Financial 
System.” Economica, 72, 201-224. 
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1989). “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations.” American Economic Review, 79, 1, 14-31. 
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1999). “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative 
Business Cycle Framework.” In Handbook of Macroeconomics, J. Taylor and 
M. Woodford, editors, Amsterdam, New York, Elsevier. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist (1996). “The Financial Accelerator and the 
Flight to Quality.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 1, 1-15. 
Bhattacharya, S. (1979). “Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the ‘Bird in 
the Hand Fallacy’” Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 259-70. 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998). “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models.” Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-43. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., Devereux, M., and F. Schiantarelli (1992). “Investment and 
Tobin's Q: Evidence from Company Panel Data.” Journal of Econometrics, 
51, 233-57. 
Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein (1990). “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency 
Problems in Financial Contracting.” American Economic Review, 80, 1, 93-
106. 
Bond, S. and J. Cummins (2001). “Noisy Share Prices and the Q Model of 
Investment.” Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper No. 01/22. 
Bond, S., Elston, J., Mairesse, J., and B. Mulkay (2003). “Financial Factors and 
Investment in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A 
Comparison Using Company Panel Data.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 85, 153-65. 
Bond, S., Hoeffler, A., and J. Temple (2001). “GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth 
Models.” University of Bristol Discussion Paper No 01/525. 
Bond, S., Klemm, A., Newton-Smith, R., Syed, M., and G. Vlieghe (2004). “The 
Roles of Expected Profitability, Tobin’s Q and Cash Flow in Econometric 
Models of Company Investment.” Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper 
No. 04/12.   26
Bond, S. and J. Van Reenen (2005). “Microeconometric Models of Investment and 
Employment.” forthcoming in J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds) Handbook of 
Econometrics, Volume 6, Elsevier, North Holland. 
Boyle, G. and G. Guthrie (2003). “Investment, Uncertainty, and Liquidity.” Journal of 
Finance, 58, 2143-66. 
Calem, P. and Rizzo, J. (1995). “Financing Constraints and Investment: New 
Evidence from the Hospital Industry Data.” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 27, 4, 1002-1014. 
Calomiris, C. and G. Hubbard (1990). “Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance, and 
‘Credit Rationing’.” Economic Journal, 100, 90-104. 
Calomiris, C., Hubbard, G., and P. Watchel (1995). “Commercial Paper, Corporate 
Finance, and the Business Cycle: A Microeconomic Perspective.” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 42, 203-50. 
Carpenter, R., Fazzari, S., and B. Petersen (1998). “Financing Constraints and 
Inventory Investment: a Comparative Study with High-Frequency Panel 
Data.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 80, 4, pp. 513-19. 
Carpenter, R. and Guariglia, A. (2003). “Cash Flow, Investment, and Investment 
Opportunities: New Tests Using UK Panel Data.” University of Nottingham 
Discussion Paper No. 03/24. 
Carpenter, R. and B. Petersen (2002a). “Is the Growth of Small Firms Constrained by 
Internal Finance?” Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 2, 298-309. 
Carpenter, R. and B. Petersen (2002b). “Capital Market Imperfections, High-tech 
Investment, and New Equity Financing.” Economic Journal, 112, F54-F72. 
Chatelain, J-B., Generale, A., Hernando, I., Von Kalckreuth, U., and P. Vermeulen 
(2003). “New Findings on Firm Investment and Monetary Transmission in the 
Euro Area.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19, 1, 73-83. 
Cleary, S. (1999). “The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status.” 
Journal of Finance, 54, 2, 673-92. 
Cleary, S. (2005). “International Corporate Investment and the Relationship between 
Financial Constraint Measures”. Journal of Banking and Finance 
(forthcoming). 
Cleary, S., Povel, P., and M. Raith (2004). “The U-Shaped Investment Curve: Theory 
and Evidence.” Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 
4206. (forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis).   27
Cooper, R. and J. Ejarque (2001). “Exhuming Q: Market Power vs. Capital Market 
Imperfections”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
8182. 
Cooper, R. and J. Ejarque (2003), “Financial Frictions and Investment: Requiem in 
Q”. Review of Economic Dynamics, 6, 710-28. 
Dasgupta, S. and K. Sengupta (2003). “Financial Constraints, Hurdle Rates, and 
Economic Analysis: Implications from a Multi-Period Model.” Mimeograph, 
Hong Kong university of Science and Technology and University of Sydney. 
Doornik, J., Arellano, M., and S. Bond (2002). “Panel Data Estimation Using DPD 
for Ox.” Nuffield College, Oxford,  
Erickson, T. and T. Whited (2000). “Measurement Error and the Relationship 
between Investment and Q.” Journal of Political Economy, 108, 5, 1027-1057. 
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, G., and B. Petersen (1988). “Financing Constraints and 
Corporate Investment.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 141-95. 
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, G., and B. Petersen (2000). “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities 
are Useful: A Comment on Kaplan and Zingales.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 115, 2, 695-705. 
Gale, D. and M. Hellwig (1985). “Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-
period Problem.” Review of Economic Studies, 52, 647-663. 
Gertler, M. and S. Gilchrist (1994). “Monetary Policy, Business Cycles and the 
Behavior of Small Manufacturing Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109, 309-40. 
Gomes, J. (2001). “Financing Investment.” American Economic Review, 91, 5, 1263-
1285. 
Government and Accountants Working Group (2004). “Facilitating Finance.” 
London. 
Guariglia, A. (1999). “The Effects of Financial Constraints on Inventory Investment: 
Evidence from a Panel of UK Firms.” Economica, 66, 43-62. 
Guariglia, A. (2000). “Inventory Investment and Capital Market Imperfections: A 
Generalization of the Linear Quadratic Inventory Model.” Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 62, 2, 223-42. 
Guariglia, A. and F. Schiantarelli (1998). “Production Smoothing, Firms' 
Heterogeneity and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Panel of UK 
Firms.” Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 63-78.   28
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1998). “Default and Renegotiation: a Dynamic Model of 
Debt.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 1, 1-41. 
Hall, B., Mairesse, J., and B. Mulkay (1999). “Firm-level Investment in France and 
the United States: an Exploration of what we have Learned in Twenty Years.” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7437.  
Huang, Z. (2002). “Financial Constraints and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity.” 
Mimeograph, St. Hugh’s College, University of Oxford. 
Hubbard, G. (1998). “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment.” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 35, 193-225. 
Islam, S. and A. Mozumdar (2002). “Financial Market Development and the 
Importance of Capital Markets: Evidence from International Data.” 
Mimeograph, Pamplin College of business, Virginia Tech. 
John, K. and J. Williams (1985), “Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: a signaling 
Equilibrium.” Journal of Finance, 40, 4, 1053-70. 
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales (1997). “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide 
Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
112, 1, 169-215.  
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales (2000). “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are Not Valid 
Measures of Financing Constraints.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 2, 
707-12. 
Kadapakkam, P-R., Kumar, P., and L. Riddick (1998). “The Impact of Cash Flows 
and Firm Size on Investment: the International Evidence.” Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 22, 293-320. 
Leland, H. and D. Pyle (1977). “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure and 
Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Finance, 32, 371-87. 
Mizen, P. and P. Vermeulen (2005). “Corporate Investment and Cash Flow 
Sensitivity. What Drives the Relationship?” European Central Bank 
Discussion Paper No. 485. 
Miller, M. and K. Rock (1985). “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information.” 
Journal of Finance, 40, 1031-52. 
Moyen, N. (2004). “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities: Constrained versus 
Unconstrained Firms.” Journal of Finance, 69, 2061-92   29
Oliner, S., Hasset, K., and J. Cummins (2005). “Investment Behavior, Observable 
Expectations, and Internal Funds.” American Economic Review, 
(forthcoming). 
Schaller, H. (1993). “Asymmetric Information, Liquidity Constraints and Canadian 
Investment.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 26, 552–74. 
Schiantarelli, F. (1995). “Financial Constraints and Investment: Methodological 
Issues and International Evidence.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 12, 2, 
70-89. 
Whited, T. (1992). “Debt, Liquidity Constraints and Corporate Investment: Evidence 
from Panel Data.” Journal of Finance, 4, 1425-60. 
Zakrajsek, E. (1997). “Retail Inventories, Internal Finance and Aggregate Fluctuations: 
Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Data.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Working Paper No. 9722. 
   30
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Manufacturing sector 
 
 

















































































































































































Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i indexes 
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of 
its capital stock; s, the logarithm of its sales; k, the logarithm of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow. NEGCFit is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a negative cash flow to capital ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise. 
MEDCFit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a positive cash flow to capital ratio in year t, which falls 
below the 75
th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the same 
industry as firm i in year t. HIGHCFit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s cash flow to capital ratio is positive in year 
t, and above the 75
th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the 
same industry as firm i in year t, and equal to 0 otherwise. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total 
real assets are in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry 
as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. MEDIUMit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the 
second and third quartiles of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i 
in year t, and 0, otherwise. LARGEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the highest quartile 
of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise.   31
Panel B: Entire economy 
 
 






























































































































































































Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i indexes 
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of 
its capital stock; s, the logarithm of its sales; k, the logarithm of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow. NEGCFit is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a negative cash flow to capital ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise. 
MEDCFit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a positive cash flow to capital ratio in year t, which falls 
below the 75
th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the same 
industry as firm i in year t. HIGHCFit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s cash flow to capital ratio is positive in year 
t, and above the 75
th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the 
same industry as firm i in year t, and equal to 0 otherwise. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total 
real assets are in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry 
as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. MEDIUMit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the 
second and third quartiles of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i 
in year t, and 0, otherwise. LARGEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the highest quartile 
of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. 
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<=1%  <= (-1.03)  0.23  <= (-2.02)  0.36 
2%-5%  (-1.03) – (-0.24)  0.15  (-2.02) – (-0.34)  0.22 
6%-10%  (-0.24) – (-0.048)  0.12  (-0.34) – (-0.005)  0.14 
11%-25%  (-0.048) – 0.11  0.10  (-0.005) – 0.10  0.10 
26%-50%  0.11 – 0.24  0.13  0.10 – 0.26  0.14 
51%-75%  0.24 – 0.49  0.20  0.26 – 0.63  0.22 
76%-90%  0.49 – 0.99  0.25  0.63- 1.52  0.31 
90%-95%  0.99 – 1.53  0.33  1.52 – 2.66  0.41 
95%-99%  1.53 – 3.54  0.37  2.66 – 7.29  0.49 
>99% >  3.54 0.40 >7.29  0.57 
 
Notes: The subscript i indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the 
firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow.   33
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J  (p-value) 0.81  0.02  0.79  0.11 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures 
reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted 
with industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J 
statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. Instruments in both columns are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)); and Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2) /Ki(t-3) 
and further lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always 
included in the instrument set. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: The effects of cash flow on investment: distinguishing firm-years on the 































































































































J  (p-value) 0.522  0.132  0.30  0.05 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures 
reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted 
with industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J 
statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. Instruments in columns (1) and (2) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) 
*(NEGFCi(t-2)), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MEDCFi(t-2)),  and CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(HIGHCFi(t-2)) and further lags. 
Instruments in columns (3) and (4) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(NEGCOVi(t-2)), 
CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MEDCOVi(t-2)), and CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(HIGHCOVi(t-2)) and further lags. Time dummies and 
time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. Also see 
Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: The effects of cash flow on investment: distinguishing firm-years on the 































































































































J  (p-value)  0.88  0.03 0.76 0.05 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures 
reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted 
with industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J 
statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. Instruments in columns (1) and (2) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) 
*(SMALLi(t-2)), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MEDIUMi(t-2)),  and CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(LARGEi(t-2)) and further lags. 
Instruments in columns (3) and (4) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(YOUNGi(t-2)), 
CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MIDDLEAGEDi(t-2)), and CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(OLDi(t-2)) and further lags. Time dummies and 
time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. Also see 
Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.   36
Table 6: The effects of cash flow on investment: distinguishing firm-years on the 




Dependent Variable: Iit / Ki(t-1) 
 



































































































































































































J  (p-value)  0.967  0.542 0.609 0.418 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying 
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments in all columns are (ki(t-2)-si(t-
2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2) and further lags, together with the relevant multiple interaction terms lagged twice or more. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. 
Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level.   37
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics when firm-years are divided on the basis of their 
coverage ratio and their age 
 
Panel A: Manufacturing sector 
 



































































































































































Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i indexes 
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of 
its capital stock; s, the logarithm of its sales; k, the logarithm of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow. NEGCOVit 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a negative coverage ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise. 
MEDCOVit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a positive coverage ratio in year t, which falls below the 
75
th percentile of the distribution of the coverage ratios of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year 
t. HIGHCOVit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s coverage ratio is positive in year t, and above the 75
th percentile of 
the distribution of the coverage ratios of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and equal to 0 
otherwise. YOUNGit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s age is in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the 
ages of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. MIDDLEAGEDit is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if firm i’s age is in the second and third quartiles of the distribution of the ages of all firms 
belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. OLDit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s 
age is in the highest quartile of the distribution of the ages of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in 
year t, and 0, otherwise.   38
Panel B: Entire economy 
 









































































































































































Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i indexes 
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of 
its capital stock; s, the logarithm of its sales; k, the logarithm of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow. NEGCOVit 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a negative coverage ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise. 
MEDCOVit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a positive coverage ratio in year t, which falls below the 
75
th percentile of the distribution of the coverage ratios of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year 
t. HIGHCOVit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s coverage ratio is positive in year t, and above the 75
th percentile of 
the distribution of the coverage ratios of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and equal to 0 
otherwise. YOUNGit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s age is in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the 
ages of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. MIDDLEAGEDit is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if firm i’s age is in the second and third quartiles of the distribution of the ages of all firms 
belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. OLDit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s 
age is in the highest quartile of the distribution of the ages of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in 
year t, and 0, otherwise. 
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